Nash equilibria in fisher market

Adsul, B and Ch, Sobhan Babu and Garg, J and Mehta, R and Sohoni, M (2010) Nash equilibria in fisher market. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6386 (M4D). pp. 30-41. ISSN 0302-9743

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Abstract

Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better payoff by feigning a different utility function and thereby manipulating the Fisher market equilibrium, we formulate the Fisher market game in which buyers strategize by posing different utility functions. We show that existence of a conflict-free allocation is a necessary condition for the Nash equilibria (NE) and also sufficient for the symmetric NE in this game. There are many NE with very different payoffs, and the Fisher equilibrium payoff is captured at a symmetric NE. We provide a complete polyhedral characterization of all the NE for the two-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.

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IITH Creators:
IITH CreatorsORCiD
Ch, Sobhan BabuUNSPECIFIED
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Conflict free; Correlated equilibria; Market equilibria; Market game; Nash equilibria; Piecewise linear; Utility functions;
Subjects: Computer science > Big Data Analytics
Divisions: Department of Computer Science & Engineering
Depositing User: Mr. Siva Shankar K
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2014 07:05
Last Modified: 05 May 2016 07:46
URI: http://raiith.iith.ac.in/id/eprint/183
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_4
OA policy: http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0302-9743/
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